Improving the Administration
of the National Labor Relations Act
Without Statutory Change by Estreicher, Samuel
FIU Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 2 Article 8 
Spring 2010 
Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act 
Without Statutory Change 
Samuel Estreicher 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without Statutory 
Change, 5 FIU L. Rev. 361 (2010). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
361 
Improving the Administration 
of the National Labor Relations Act 
Without Statutory Change 
Samuel Estreicher* 
For the first time in more than three decades, there is now considerable 
political momentum for the passage of significant pro-union amendments to 
the basic federal labor law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or 
Act).1  First enacted in 1935, the Act is administered by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB or Board), an independent agency of the federal 
government.  Five members serve on the Board when it is at full strength;2 
the General Counsel of the agency is an independent office.3  The Act was 
amended to restrict union organizing and bargaining tactics in 19474 and 
1959.5  Aside from the 1974 amendments that extended the Act’s reach to 
the not-for-profit health care sector,6 there have been no further substantive 
changes in the statute.  The Act has not been changed despite a plummeting 
unionization rate in private companies – from thirty-five percent in the mid-
1950s to under eight percent today – and persistent complaints from the 
labor movement and its congressional allies, who argue that employer   
opposition, both lawful and unlawful, is eviscerating the rights of associa-
tion and collective bargaining the Act supposedly safeguards. 
Labor’s effort during the Carter administration to bolster NLRA reme-
dies for unlawful employer conduct, the Labor Reform Act of 1977, did not 
                                                                                                                           
 * Samuel Estreicher is the Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law and Director of the Center for 
Labor and Employment Law at New York University School of Law.  This paper was originally pub-
lished under the same title in 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L.1 (2009).  An earlier version of this paper was 
delivered at NYU’s 62nd Annual Conference on Labor on June 4, 2009.  Professor Estreicher wishes to 
acknowledge the helpful comments of National Labor Relations Board officials Peter Carlton, John 
Ferguson, Wayne Gold, John Higgins, Wilma Liebman, and Ronald Meisburg; Elizabeth Kilpatrick was 
invaluable on NLRB data.  Any persisting mistakes are entirely the author’s responsibility.  Copyright © 
by Samuel Estreicher 2009-2011.  All rights are reserved.     
1     29 U.S.C.  §§ 151-169 (2006). 
 2 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). 
 3 NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). 
 4 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 5 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 6 Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C.  §§ 152, 168, 171 
(2006)). 
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gather enough support to overcome a threatened filibuster in the Senate.7  
Twenty years later, President Clinton had his secretaries of labor and    
commerce appoint the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations, chaired by Harvard professor John T.  Dunlop, who served as 
secretary of labor in the Ford administration.  Though tempered by the 1994 
midterm election results, the Dunlop Commission recommended greater 
access to employers’ property by union organizers, quicker representation 
elections, and stronger remedies for employer violations.8  Those recom-
mendations were not implemented.  Since the Clinton administration, a 
rising chorus of voices among union-side practitioners and academics has 
questioned whether the NLRA has become obsolete.9 
The 2008 election cycle suggests, however, a shift in the political 
winds and a more promising political environment for pro-union changes in 
the NLRA.  With strong backing from organized labor, Barack Obama re-
gained  the  presidency  for  the  Democrats  and  brought  with  him  com-
manding Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress.  There is now 
considerable avowed support for the proposed Employee Free Choice Act 
(EFCA), labor’s principal legislative priority.  The EFCA, which passed the 
House of Representatives in 2007,10 would alter labor law in three signifi-
cant ways. 
First, section 2 authorizes so-called “card-check certification” by the 
NLRB.  Such certification essentially allows unions to obtain bargaining 
authority and trigger an employer’s duty to bargain solely by presenting to 
the agency authorization card signatures from a majority of employees in an 
appropriate unit.  Elections would no longer be required. 
Second, section 3 provides that if ninety days of bargaining between a 
certified union representative and the employer do not result in a collective 
bargaining agreement, either party may petition the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service (FMCS).  The FMCS initially would provide media-
tion services, but if the parties do not come to a voluntary agreement, it 
would be required to refer the dispute to an arbitration panel that “shall 
render a decision settling the dispute” for a two-year period. 
                                                                                                                           
 7 S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); 124 CONG. REG.18,398, 18,400 
(1978). 
 8 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF 
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xvii--xxi (1.994) [hereinafter 
DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of 
Labor Law Reform,12 LAB. LAW. 117, 121 (1996). 
 9 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527 (2002). 
 10 Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800,110th Cong. (2007). 
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Third, section 4 requires the Board to seek preliminary injunctions to 
reinstate workers discharged during organizing and election campaigns.  It 
authorizes the agency to levy liquidated damages of twice back pay owed to 
those discharged workers and, in the case of willful or repeated employer 
violations, to impose a civil penalty of up to $20,000 per violation. 
As of this writing, it is not clear whether the EFCA as proposed will be 
enacted.  Much depends on whether its proponents can in fact marshal a 
filibuster-proof majority of sixty votes in the Senate and, if not, whether a 
compromise can be struck that will garner the necessary support.  This   
Article does not take a position on whether the EFCA should become law.  
It instead identifies changes the NLRB can implement on its own, without 
statutory amendment, to improve its administration of the NLRA in its core 
functions of resolving questions concerning representation and enforcing 
the Act’s prohibitions against employer and union misconduct.  NLRB  
representation elections will happen regardless of whether the EFCA     
becomes law.  Even at the stage of initial organization, some unions and 
employee groups will continue to pursue the election route because they 
wish to obtain the greater legitimacy and bargaining leverage that a        
victorious secret-ballot election confers on the bargaining agent.  Moreover, 
elections will still be needed to decide whether to decertify unions or to de-
authorize union-security arrangements.11 
As the Board continues to hold elections, it is important to determine 
whether it can hold them more quickly, how it can handle unit certification 
and other issues more expeditiously, whether it can provide union          
organizers greater and earlier access to employees, and whether it can en-
hance remedies for unlawful employer and union conduct that mars fair 
election conditions.  Similarly, the Board will still need to address bargain-
ing obligations under the Act, whatever the EFCA’s legislative fate.  Even 
under a first-contract interest-arbitration regime, issues of bargaining obli-
gation are likely to arise during the early stages when the parties attempt to 
negotiate or secure arbitral imposition of a first contract, and the resolution 
of those issues may inform what the arbitration panel includes in a first 
contract.12  When all contracts are up for renewal – whether those           
                                                                                                                           
 11 For a proposal conducive to an “easy in, easy out” approach to representation elections, see 
Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501 (2000). 
 12 As an example of how bargaining issues may be considered, see section 43(2) of the Ontario 
Labour Relations Act, which provides for consideration of the employer’s (or union’s) unreasonable 
bargaining as a factor in whether to direct a first-contract interest arbitration: 
(2) The Board shall consider and make its decision on an application under subsection (1) within 
30 days of receiving the application and it shall direct the settlement of a first collective agreement 
by arbitration where, irrespective of whether section 17 has been contravened, it appears to the 
Board that the process of collective bargaining has been unsuccessful because of, 
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negotiated by the parties or those imposed by arbitrations the first time 
around – the NLRB will still need to determine whether a party has satis-
fied its duty to bargain in good faith, and identify appropriate remedies for 
any violations.  The scope of any legislative change depends in significant 
part on the degree of confidence the players in the system have in the utility 
and fairness of the Board’s administration of existing law, and their views 
of the suitability of that law to current conditions. 
This Article begins with suggestions for improving the Board’s proce-
dures in representation and unfair labor practice (ULP) cases; the next sec-
tion suggests modifications of key substantive rules or policies of the    
agency.  No attempt is made here, however, to provide a comprehensive 
account of what the Board can and should do in the process of administra-
tive overhaul. 
I.  SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING NLRB PROCEDURES  
A. Identify and Address Causes of Delay 
The first and critical step in any serious effort at reform of the Board’s 
administration of the Act is to examine where agency delay is a problem; 
what factors cause delay; and how the Board can minimize those factors 
without undermining the overall goal of fair, efficient procedures for inves-
tigations, fact finding, adjudication, and internal review and decision    
making.  “Physician, heal thyself” is the appropriate maxim here.  This is 
not the place for an extensive analysis of the problem of administrative de-
lay under the NLRA.13  The chairman of the Board would be well advised to 
appoint an advisory committee to investigate and analyze the problem and 




                                                                                                                           
(a) the refusal of the employer to recognize the bargaining authority of the trade union; 
(b) the uncompromising nature of any bargaining position adopted by the respondent without rea-
sonable justification; 
(c) the failure of the respondent to make reasonable or expeditious efforts to conclude a collective 
agreement; or 
(d) any other reason the Board considers relevant. 
S.O.1995, ch.1, sched.  A (amended 2006).  
 13 For a limited initial effort, see Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T. Bodie, Administrative Delay at 
the NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES. 87 (2002). 
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1. Representation Cases 
a.  Reducing the Time Period Between Filing a Petition 
  and Holding an Election 
(i) “An Appropriate Hearing”? The current debates over the EFCA 
and the 1994 Dunlop Commission report suggest that too much time ex-
pires between filing an election petition and holding a representation elec-
tion.  This is considered problematic because employee interest in collective 
representation can wane and dissipate simply by the passage of time.  The 
gap in time before the election takes place also enables employers to reduce 
support for the union by running anti-union campaigns, whether or not the 
tactics used are deemed unlawful.14 
How long is the gap between petition and election? The Dunlop 
Commission noted in 1994 that the “median time from petitioning for an 
election to a vote has been roughly fifty days for the last two decades (down 
considerably from the time taken in the 1940s and 1950s).”15  The Board 
has made considerable progress in this area.  In fiscal year 2008, initial 
elections in representation cases were held in a median of thirty-eight days 
from the filing of the petition, and 95.1% of all initial elections were con-
ducted within fifty-six days of the filing of the petition.16 
The NLRA does not prescribe when an election must be held after a 
petition has been filed.  The Dunlop Commission recommended that repre-
sentation elections should be conducted “as promptly as administratively 
feasible, typically no later than two weeks after a petition is filed.”17  The 
1977 proposed labor reform legislation18 would have required an election 
between twenty-one days (under the House bill) or thirty days (under the 
                                                                                                                           
 14 The assumption of this essay is that it is desirable to reduce the time between the filing of a 
petition and the holding of an election.  This is not necessarily true, however, if the predominant objec-
tive is to provide for an opportunity for the employee electorate to hear opposing views before casting 
their ballots. 
 15 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF 
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT-FINDING REPORT 66 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP 
COMMISSION FACT-FINDING]; See also Myron Roomkin & Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and 
the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U ILL. L. REV. 75, 85 (1981) 
(reporting that between 1972 and 1978, the average tune in uncontested cases between filing a petition 
and holding an election was about 1.75 months, compared to about 3.5 months in contested cases). 
 16 See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM.GC 09-03, Summary of Operations for the Fiscal 
Year 2008, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/search/nlrbsearch/GC09.03.  Table 1 infra indicates that 
median and average time periods between filing a petition and holding an election are nearly the same 
for 2000 and 2008.  Ferguson also reports that for the period 1999 to 2004, “[t]he average case that went 
to election did so in 41 days, and 95% of elections were held within 75 days of filing.”  John-Paul Fer-
guson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 62 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 3, 10 n.9 (2008). 
 17 DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT supra note 8, at 19. 
 18 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Senate bill) from the filing of a petition if the petitioned-for unit was appro-
priate under a Board regulation.19  Presumably, the Board could implement 
even a fourteen-day proposal on its own.  It is not clear, however, that    
decreasing the existing median from thirty-eight days to fourteen days 
would be administratively feasible20 or otherwise desirable.21 
 Table 1: Petition, Election, Certification Comparisons, 2000 and 2008 
Petition to Election 2008 2000 
Min. No. of Days from Petition 
to Election 
3 6 
Max. No. of Days from Petition 
to Election 
2,152 2,108 
Average No. of Days from Petition 
to Election 
57 53 
Median No. of Days from Petition 
to Election 
38 41 
No. of Elections More Than 56 Days 
from Petition 
251 of 2,024 
(12.43%) 
532 of 3,497 
(15.21%) 
Election to Certification 2008 2000 
Min. No. of Days from Election 
to Certification 
0 0 
Max. No. of Days from Election 
to Certification 
458 3,307 
Average No. of Days from Election 
to Certification 
22 31 
Median No. of Days from Election 
to Certification 
11 11 
No. of Certifications More Than 21 Days 
from Election 
361 of 1,898 
(19.20%) 
747 of 3,325 
(22.47%) 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-637, at 55 (1977) (requiring an election to be held within fifteen days 
after filing of petition if petitioned-for unit was defined as appropriate in a rule or prior decision in the 
industry; in other cases, the election would be held within forty-five days unless issues of exceptional 
novelty or complexity were presented); S. REP. NO. 95-628, at 50-51(1978) (same, except providing for 
a period of twenty-one to thirty days in cases where a rule defined the requested unit as appropriate). 
 20 The problem may not be with average or median periods but with highly contested cases.  See 
discussion and Table 2 infra Part I.A.1.a.ii, Professor Cooper’s 1984 study suggests that during the 
period she examined quick elections do not always benefit the union.  See Laura J. Cooper, Authoriza-
tion Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption 
Underlying the Supreme Court’s Gissel Decision, 79 N.W. U.L. REV.  87,122,122 tbl.12 (1984) (unions 
succeed 18.4% of the time when elections are held within two to four weeks). 
 21 Expanding union access to the employee electorate would also require additional time.  See 
supra note 14 and discussion infra Part II.A. 
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Petition for Certification 2008 2000 
Min. No. of Days from Petition 
to Certification 
18 15 
Max. No. of Days from Election 
to Certification 
2,275 3,341 
Average No. of Days from Petition 
to Certification 
77 84 
Median No. of Days from Petition 
to Certification 
50 54 
No. of Certifications More Than 100 Days 
after Election 
250 of 1,898 
(13.17%) 
486 of 3,325 
(14.62%) 
Source: NLRB data (on file with author). 
Where cases do not involve significant issues (or the parties stipulate 
to an accelerated schedule), the regional director should be able to hold a 
fairly prompt election, perhaps within a two-week period.  It is doubtful, 
however, whether two weeks would be sufficient time, even with a strong 
administrative hand, to address difficult unit and supervisor-exclusion   
issues responsibly.  To reduce the number of such cases, the Board might 
consider changing the sequence in which it considers unit and exclusion 
issues.  Currently, supervisor-exclusion issues are addressed in a hearing 
before an election is conducted.  Perhaps in many cases the election could 
happen first, based on an electorate that reflects well-established Board 
decisions as to the presumptively appropriate unit and likely disposition of 
eligibility issues.  This could be possible in many cases, even in the absence 
of a consent-election agreement between the parties.  The election results 
would not be certified, however, until the unit and eligibility issues were 
properly resolved in a hearing at the regional level with limited discretion-
ary review by the Board.  In some cases, the results of the post-balloting 
hearing might require a second election; in most cases, they would not. 
During the Clinton administration, the Board looked into the issue and 
decided that section 9(c)(1) of the Act mandates the current sequence.22  The 
section provides in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Angelica Healthcare Serv. Group, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1321 (1995) (“We find that the 
language of Section 9(c)(1) of the Act and [29 C.F.R.] Section 102.63(a) of the Board’s Rules required 
the Acting Regional Director to provide ‘an appropriate hearing’ prior to finding that a question con-
cerning representation existed and directing an election.”); DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, 
at 19 (“The requirement that the Board hold pre-election legal hearings prevents it from expediting the 
election process in a significant way.”).  Former NLRB Chairman William B. Gould notes that the 
Board in Angelica held that “a hearing in some form is required prior to the time the election takes 
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Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such 
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board . . . the Board shall in-
vestigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a 
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for 
an appropriate hearing upon due notice. . . . If the Board finds upon 
the record of such hearing that such a question of representation      
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the 
results thereof.23 
Originally enacted as part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments,24 the 
provision arguably narrowed the discretion the Board had under the Wagner 
Act,25 in part to implement the Taft-Hartley requirement of elections as a 
prerequisite to NLRB certification.26 
                                                                                                                           
place. . . . although it was not addressed . . . precisely how one would define a hearing.”  William B. 
Gould IV, Labored Relations: Law, Politics, and the NLRB 410 app. (2000).   
 23 NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 24 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).   
 25 Section 9(c) of the original Wagner Act provided: 
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the 
Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of 
the representatives that have been designated or selected.  In any such investigation, the Board 
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding 
under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any suitable 
method to ascert[a]in such representatives. 
49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006)). 
 26 The Board experimented with prehearing elections starting in 1945.  See NLRB THIRTEENTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 
1948, at 20 (1949); NLRB, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1947, at 3 (1948).  During the Taft-Hartley deliberations,   
Congress rejected a provision in conference that would have expressly authorized such elections.  Ex-
plaining the conference committee’s actions, Senator Taft insisted that the committee was not changing 
existing law: 
Section 9(c)(4): The conferees dropped from this section a provision authorizing pre-hearing elec-
tions.  That omission has brought forth the charge that we have thereby greatly impeded the Board 
in its disposition of representation matters.  We have not changed the words of existing law provid-
ing a hearing in every ease unless waived by stipulation of the parties.  It is the function of hear-
ings in, representation cases to determine whether an election may properly be held at the time; 
and if so, to decide questions of unit and eligibility to vote.  During the last year the Board has 
tried out a device of holding the election first and then providing the hearing to which the parties 
were entitled by law.  Since its use has been confined to an inconsequential percentage of cases, 
and more often than not a subsequent hearing was still necessary and because the House conferees 
strenuously objected to its continuance it was omitted from the bill. 
93 Cong. Reg. S7002 (daily ed. June 12, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT ACT, 1947, at 1625 (1985).  The Board in 1948, however, read the 
1947 amendment as “abolish[ing] . . . a practice instituted in 1945, of permitting the Regional Director 
in appropriate circumstances to conduct the election, upon due notice to the parties, before holding the 
hearing.”  NLRB, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 20. 
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Section 9(c)(1) plainly requires the Board to hold “an appropriate 
hearing” prior to the election to satisfy itself that a question concerning 
representation exists.  The issue is whether more is required in this pre-
election hearing other than to determine whether the labor organization has 
petitioned for an election in a unit whose appropriateness is well-
established under agency case law, to determine whether the agency has 
statutory jurisdiction in the particular case, and to mandate the sealing of 
any challenged ballots, including challenges based on eligibility issues.  If 
the respondent believes that the facts of its case require some variance from 
well-established Board law, that matter, if properly preserved, could be  
taken up after the election in a second-stage precertification inquiry.  Func-
tionally, this precertification inquiry would be similar to the situation where 
the Board grants a request for review from the regional director’s decision 
directing an election.  Neither the request nor the grant of the request      
operates as a stay of the election.27 
(ii) Addressing Highly Contested Cases  The problem of delay in rep-
resentation cases may have less to do with the median cases than with   
highly contested cases.28  Consider the following preliminary results from 
NLRB data: 
                         Table 2: Effect of Blocking Charges, 2008  
No.  of Petitions Proceeding to Election in 2008 2,024 
No.  of Blocked Petitions   284 
Median No.  of Days from Petition to Election in Blocked Cases   139 
No.  of Unblocked Petitions 1,740 
Median No. of Days from Petition to Election in Unblocked Cases     38 
Average No.  of Days from Petition to Election in Unblocked Cases     39 
Source: NLRB data (on file with author).  
The Board should study the characteristics of the cases that take the 
longest time.  For example, in 2008, 12.4% of the cases took longer than the 
median time to go to election and took longer than three weeks from the 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (2009). 
 28 Thus, for example, Ferguson reports: “The tail . . . is quite long; the maximum delay before 
election recorded in the data is 1,705 days. . . . The average time to election or withdrawal was 50 days, 
and cases in the 95th percentile were open for 234 days.” Ferguson, supra note 16, at 10 n.9; see also 
DUNLOP COMMISSION FACT-FINDING, supra note 15 at 81 ex.III-3.  A good portion of this tail appears to 
be comprised of “blocked” cases.  See Berton B. Subrin, The NLRB’s Blocking Charge Policy: Wisdom 
or Folly?, 39 LAB. L.J. 651(1988), and infra Table 2. 
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election for the results to be certified.  As Table 2 indicates, in 284 of the 
2,024 petitions that proceeded to election in 2008, allegations of employer 
violations triggered the filing of a “blocking charge” by a labor organiza-
tion, delaying the holding of the election, The median for this subset was 
139 days compared to thirty-eight days overall.  To the extent the Board’s 
blocking-charge policy is exploited by charging parties unreasonably to 
delay elections, the Board should reexamine that policy and hold elections 
sooner even in the face of outstanding unfair labor practices.29 
b.  Experimenting with Internet and Mail Balloting 
The Board could experiment with broader use of mail balloting and 
possible Internet polling procedures that permit employees to cast anony-
mous ballots away from the employer’s premises.30  This would meet the 
criticism that making employees vote on representation at their workplace 
unnecessarily brings home the message of employer power and possible 
intimidation.31  The National Mediation Board (NMB), the agency respon-
sible for conducting representation elections under the Railway Labor Act, 
uses such procedures and, as Professor Sachs suggests,32 the Board can 
adapt them for NLRA purposes.33  Nothing in the NLRA requires that the 
polling place be at the place of work or any other particular location. 
2. Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
Delay in the system in connection with unfair labor practices could   
occur at several stages: (1) the period between filing a charge and issuing a 
complaint; (2) the period between issuing the complaint and closing the 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Subrin, supra note 28.  It is not always clear that the best response to alleged employer 
unlawful practices is deferring the holding of an election; it is hardly inconceivable that the relatively 
prompt convening of an election, coupled with broadened section 10(j) preliminary injunctive relief, 
provides a better cure.  See discussion infra Part II.C.  
 30 The Board presently uses mail balloting when eligible voters are “scattered,” meaning they 
work over a vast geographic area or their work schedules vary significantly.  E.g., Halliburton Serv., 265 
N.L.R.B. 1154, 1188 (1982) (noting that an election should be held on the employer’s premises absent 
good cause to the contrary, as determined by the regional director); see also NLRB, CASE HANDLING 
MANUAL,  pt.   2   §  11301.2  (2003),   available  at  http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/CHM2/ 
CHM2.pdf. 
 31 See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal 
Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 565-69 (1993).  On the other hand, mail or Internet balloting raises 
issues of possible intimidation by union representatives and may lead to lower employee turnout than 
workplace balloting. 
 32 See Benjamin Sachs, Card Check and Employee Choice: A New Altering Rule for Labor Law’s 
Asymmetric Default, 123 HARV. L. REV. 3 (forthcoming Jan. 2010). 
 33 The NMB’s Telephone Electronic Voting and Internet Voting system does not presently permit 
employees to change their votes once they have been cast.  Nat’l Mediation Bd., Frequently Asked 
Questions: Representation, http://www.nmb.gov/representation/faqs-ola.html. 
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record of the adversary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ); 
(3) the period between closing the record and issuance of the ALJ’s deci-
sion; (4) the period between issuance of the ALJ’s decision and, if there are 
exceptions, the order and decision by the Board itself; and (5) the period 
between the issuance of the Board’s order and decision and the ruling of the 
court of appeals to enforce the Board’s order.  Only the first four areas are 
within the Board’s ambit of influence.  Dealing with the fifth would require 
a statutory amendment providing for self-enforcing Board orders, with the 
burden on the respondent to secure a judicial stay of the agency order. 
 
Table 3: Section 10(j) Cases Resulting in District Court Filings, 2004-08 
Filing of Charge to District Court Filing 
Minimum No. of Days 88 
Maximum No. of Days 1,658 
Average No. of Days 334 
Median No. of Days 263 
Filing of Charge to RD Determination 
Minimum No. of Days 22 
Maximum No. of Days 1,603 
Average No. of Days 187 
Median No. of Days 120 
From RD Determination to Advice Determination 
Minimum No. of Days 15 
Maximum No. of Days 550 
Average No. of Days 111 
Median No. of Days 65 
Filing of Charge to Advice Determination 
Minimum No. of Days 70 
Maximum No. of Days 1,630 
Average No. of Days 309 
Median No. of Days 219 
Filing of Charge to Board Determination 
Minimum No. of Days 88 
Maximum No. of Days 1,652 
Average No. of Days 334 
Median No. of Days 264 
From Advice Determination to Board Determination 
Minimum No. of Days 0 
Maximum No. of Days 106 
Average No. of Days 23 
Median No. of Days 29 
 
372 FIU Law Review [5:361 
 
From Board Determination to District Court Filing 
Minimum No. of Days 1 
Maximum No. of Days 68 
Average No. of Days 5 
Median No. of Days 8 
Source: NLRB data (on file with author). Details of the cases references in Table 3 
are provided in Appendix A. 
For cases completed during the Board’s fiscal year ending September 
30, 2008, a median of 559 days transpired from the filing of a charge to 
issuance of a Board decision.  A good part of this delay is after the hearing 
has been completed and the ALJ has issued his or her decision; it took 269 
days for the median ALJ decision to culminate in a Board decision.34  For 
fiscal year 2003, the numbers were, respectively, 647 days and 420 days.35  
These figures suggest a continuing problem.  Once the Board reaches 
its full membership complement, the Board should authorize its chairman to 
assign cases to Board members,36 place time limits on how long a case can 
remain on a Board member’s desk, and, if those limits are not met, reassign 
the case to another Board member.37 
B. Greater Use of Rulemaking 
The Supreme Court made clear in a unanimous 1991 decision,     
American Hospital Association v. NLRB,38 that the Board has substantive 
rulemaking authority under section 6 of the Act.39  The Board has not used 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See NLRB, SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, at 138, available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual% 20Reports/Entire2008Annual.pdf. While 
2008 may not be a representative year because the Board only had two members, the figures for 2003, 
when the Board enjoyed a full complement of five members, suggest even longer time periods.  NLRB, 
SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE 
FISCAL  YEAR  ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30,  2003,  at  199,   available  at  http:// www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/ 
shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2003AnnualReportreduced.pdf. 
 35 NLRB, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report, supra note 34, at 199. 
 36 Congress barred the Board itself from employing “any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing 
transcripts of hearing or preparing drafts of opinions.”  NLRA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).  This 
should not prevent the agency chairman or any other member from using his or her attorney staff and 
sometimes pooling several members' staff to screen cases that can be decided by summary decision and 
those that require assignment to a Board member for a more extended decision.  See generally John E. 
Higgins Jr., Labor Czars – Commissars – Keeping Women in the Kitchen – The Purpose and Effects of 
the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.  941 (1998). 
 37 See Estreicher & Bodie, supra note 13, at 95-96. 
 38 499 U.S. 609 (1991). 
 39 Id. at 609 (“Section 6 granted the Board ‘authority from time to time to make, amend, and 
rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions’ of the Act.” 
(quoting NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006))). 
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this authority, however, with the exception of the rules for bargaining units 
in acute health care facilities upheld by American Hospital Association.40  
One reason the Board may hesitate to use its rulemaking power is a desire 
to shield itself from congressional scrutiny that may not occur when Board 
members embed their policy judgments in factual determinations made in 
the course of adjudications.  During the Clinton administration, the Board 
proposed a rule establishing the appropriateness of a single-location bar-
gaining unit in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances.” Congress 
barred use of any monies on the single-location proceeding, however, and 
the Board abandoned the effort after three years.41  This experience suggests 
that the Board will not readily embark on additional experiments of this 
type. 
The Clinton Board’s unhappy experience with the single-location rule 
offers a cautionary note, but should not discourage use of rulemaking alto-
gether.  The agency is likely to be on a firmer footing if it uses rulemaking, 
not for the purpose of rigidifying a Board standard for all industries irre-
spective of countervailing factual circumstances – such as the presumptive 
appropriateness of single-location units – but for the more limited purpose 
of providing for a uniform rule where nationwide uniformity makes sense.  
One such area would be a proposed rule setting forth the text of a poster 
reciting the rights of employees under the NLRA that employers would be 
required to post in cafeterias and break areas alongside similar notices from 
other government agencies.42 Another potentially fruitful effort would be a 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See generally Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for           
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); Mark H.  Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An 
Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991). 
 41 See Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible 
Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 501-02, nn.151-52 (2000).  Congress in 
1947 also curiously barred the Board from “appoint[ingl individuals for . . . economic analysis.”  NLRA 
§ 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).  A history of this exclusion is given in Catherine Fisk & Deborah C. 
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Sug-
gestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2045-49 (2009).  The section 4(a) limitation did not hamper the 
Board when it promulgated health care bargaining units in 1988.  See Collective-Bargaining Units in the 
Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,336-46 (Apr.  21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30) 
(certification required by Regulatory Flexibility Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006)).  In the Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Congress provided for judicial review of agency 
compliance with its regulatory fairness review requirements.  5 U.S.C. § 805 (2006) (amended 2007).  
Whatever the intention behind the section 4(a) prohibition, it does not bar the Board from hiring indi-
viduals with statistical expertise, or from borrowing staff from other agencies, to help it conduct regula-
tory compliance reviews. 
 42 Along with Professor Charles J. Morris, the author asked the Board to issue such a rule back in 
1993 – a petition the Board has yet to act upon.  See AFL-CIO General Counsel Urges NLRB to Require 
Notices Describing NLRA Rights, 192 DAILY LAB. REP.  (BNA) A-10 (Oct. 3, 2003).  The Department 
of Labor has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would require a similar notification of NLRA 
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proposed rule containing the text of a model authorization card that would 
be used for ascertaining both whether there is sufficient interest to hold an 
election and whether there is a card majority in circumstances where bar-
gaining authority could be established without an election (as proposed by 
section 2 of the EFCA). 
NLRB policy reversals – which come with each new administration as 
surely as spring follows winter – is another area where properly employed 
rulemaking would enhance the confidence of the parties that acting in con-
formity with preexisting Board law will not result in adverse remedial con-
sequences.  Confining policy reversal to the rulemaking process also would 
encourage greater judicial deference.  It would be strongly presumed that 
until a new rule has been promulgated, the General Counsel would issue 
complaints on the basis of preexisting NLRB law.  The Board thus would 
promote certainty and establish a process likely to lead to better rules.  In 
essence, the regulated public would be told in advance which prior deci-
sions the Board is interested in possibly reversing and would be asked to 
address specific questions and identify sources of information that would 
aid the agency.43 
II.  SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN NLRB POLICY 
I address here only three of the several areas of Board policy that 
should be revisited: union access rules, voluntary “framework” agreements 
subject to “ex post authorization,” and remedies. 
A. Access Rules 
The Supreme Court has made clear that unless employees are living 
near worksites distant from the usual means of communication, the Board 
cannot hold employers in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA if, with-
out discrimination, they refuse to allow nonemployee union organizers on 
their property to address employees.44  The Court has not purported, howev-
                                                                                                                           
rights by federal contractors.  Notification of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws, 74 Fed. Reg. 
38,488 (proposed Aug. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 471). 
 43 Even if the Board does not employ rulemaking, it could still use a better process for policy 
reversals.  The Board could publish notice of an Agenda of Proposed Policy Changes with an opportuni-
ty for public comment.  Cases presenting issues listed on this Agenda would be prime targets for issu-
ance of a complaint and expedited consideration.  Oral argument and briefing would be scheduled for 
every case on the Agenda thought to be a vehicle for a policy reversal.  To focus attention and avoid 
repetition, any oral argument should be limited to one hour for each side of the issue.  Thus, absent 
special circumstances, the General Counsel and the charging party would be limited to a half hour each, 
and the respondent to one hour.  Any amici wishing to argue would need to secure consent of the party 
to share its time. 
 44 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).   
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er, to alter the scope of the Board’s authority,45 first announced in General 
Shoe Corp.,46 to establish under section 9 of the NLRA the preconditions 
(“laboratory conditions”) under which it will certify the results of an elec-
tion rather than hold a rerun election.  Under this doctrine, the Board can 
overturn elections not conforming to “laboratory conditions” whether or not 
an unfair labor practice has been committed and presumably without regard 
to statutory limits on its ULP authority, such as the so-called employer free 
speech provision, section 8(c) of the NLRA.47  The Board has used its    
General Shoe authority to bar massed-assembly speeches on company time 
within twenty-four hours of a scheduled election,48 and to require employers 
to transmit a list of the names and addresses of the employees eligible to 
vote in the election to the petitioning union seven days after the scheduling 
of an election.  (The latter is called an “Excelsior list” because the rule was 
announced in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.49) 
The Board’s Excelsior decision suggests a persuasive rationale for ex-
panding union access rights in particular circumstances.  The Board distin-
guished earlier Supreme Court decisions in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co.50 and NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America,51 which barred union 
access rights under the Board’s section 8 ULP authority.52  In the Excelsior 
context, the Board reasoned, employees’ section 7 interests were centrally 
involved, thus altering the balance between employer interests and section 7 
rights: 
[E]ven assuming that there is some legitimate employer interest in 
nondisclosure, we think it relevant that the subordination of the        
interest which we here require is limited to a situation in which em-
ployee interests in self organization are shown to be substantial.  For, 
whenever an election is directed (the precondition to disclosure) the 
Regional Director has found that a real question concerning represen-
tation exists, . . . The opportunity to communicate on company    
                                                                                                                           
 45 NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006). 
 46 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
 47 Id. at 126 (“Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will 
sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor 
practice.”). 
 48 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). 
 49 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
 50 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (presaging the Court’s decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 
(1992)). 
 51 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
 52 Id. at 363-64; Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112. 
376 FIU Law Review [5:361 
 
premises sought in Babcock and Nutone was not limited to the situa-
tion in which employee organizational interests were substantial. . . .53 
By similar reasoning, the Board could claim authority under General 
Shoe to declare that a fair election process requires that once a union has 
presented a showing of interest sufficient to trigger a representation elec-
tion, the interests of the employee electorate in making an informed deci-
sion require that the union be given limited access to the employees on the 
company premises to present its case.54  Similar to the access rules often 
sought by unions in “neutrality” agreements, the union’s access could be 
limited to nonwork areas like the parking lot, cafeteria, and break room, and 
could be conditioned on compliance with reasonable security procedures.  
Because union access under this proposal would be triggered by the Board’s 
determination of an interest requirement rather than any particular expres-
sive activity of the employer, there should be no serious section 8(c) con-
cern with this application of the General Shoe doctrine.  55 
B. Promoting Voluntary Recognition Agreements Subject to “Ex Post 
Authorization” 
The Board should revisit its prior decision in Majestic Weaving Co., 
Inc.,56 in which it ruled that employers violate the law if they recognize 
unions before they have obtained majority support, even if the recognition 
or agreement is expressly subject to a later showing of majority support.  
The Board’s ruling is based on a flawed analysis.  The statutory prohibition 
is employer recognition of a minority union, not discussions with a union 
on the basic approach to future bargaining should the union demonstrate 
majority support in an appropriate unit.  Overturning Majestic Weaving 
would provide employers and unions greater leeway to enter into agree-
                                                                                                                           
 53 Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1245. 
 54 See generally Julius G.  Getman,Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 45, 71 (1986) (“The missing ingredient of free choice is most likely to be a sense of the 
particular union involved in the campaign: its representatives, its arguments, and its record.  It seems 
obvious that employees who know the employer but are doubtful about the union ought to be given the 
chance to learn about the union at first hand.”). 
 55 For developments under the Railway Labor Act, see US Airways, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation 
Bd.,177 F.3d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding NMB’s order for rerun election on grounds of employer 
interference violated employer’s right to free speech when employer speech based on objective predic-
tions); Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) (arguing that laboratory conditions doctrine as currently enforced is contrary 
to statute and to employer's First Amendment right to free speech). 
 56 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Majestic Weav-
ing Co., Inc., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.  1966).  Majestic Weaving overruled the Board’s prior decision in 
Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38, 39 (1949) (holding in pertinent part that a contract begun with a 
minority union is valid if the union has a majority by the time the contract is executed). 
2010] Improving Administration of NLRA Without Statutory Change 377 
 
ments providing a framework for future recognition even if the union does 
not have the majority support of employees in the bargaining unit at the 
time of the agreement.  The Board should, however, insist on two essential 
requirements: 
(1) transparency – the parties must openly state that they are entering 
into a framework agreement setting only guidelines for any future 
bargaining for a collective bargaining agreement, and that bargaining 
would not take place until the union obtains bargaining authority; and 
(2) “ex post authorization” – the agreement must expressly provide an 
opportunity for the employees to decide later, preferably by secret bal-
lot, whether they wish to authorize the union’s bargaining authority. 
This approach would impart valuable information to employees to 
guide their decision because the framework agreement would illuminate the 
union’s bargaining objectives and its likely efficacy as a bargaining agent.  
It also would provide an opportunity for the parties to explore new         
approaches to a bargaining relationship, especially at new sites of employ-
ment.57 
C. Remedies 
Remedies are the linchpin.  A law is only as good as its remedies, and 
the NLRB’s remedial authority as practiced seems particularly deficient.  
Even here, the agency can do a good deal more with its statutory authority 
than it has in the past. 
1. Delegation of section 10(j) Authority to the General Counsel 
The extent to which employers unlawfully discharge union supporters 
during organizing drives and elections remains unclear, in part because the 
Board until very recently did not collect reliable data on the subject.       
Apparently, the Board’s data did not differentiate ULP charges filed during 
union organizing campaigns from those against unionized employers until 
2007.58  Rough estimates of the frequency before 2007 vary.  Harvard law 
professor Paul Weiler estimated in 1983 that one in twenty union supporters 
                                                                                                                           
 57 The author advanced this proposal in Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law 
Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834-40 (1996).  
The Dunlop Commission’s recommendation would allow a subsequent showing of majority support 
“either by card check or representation election.”  DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 11; 
see also Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, Forum:At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be 
Retired?: A Response to Professor Dannin, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 301-06 (2005). 
 58 See J. Justin Wilson, AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NLRB DATA ON UNLAWFUL TERMINATION 
DURING UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS, 2007 TO 2008, at 1, n.5 (2009) (on file with author). 
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is unlawfully fired.59  The late University of Chicago law professor Bernard 
Meltzer and economist Robert LaLonde calculated a one-in-sixty-three 
probability of unlawful discharge in 1991.60  Researchers John Schmitt and 
Ben Zipperer estimated a one-in-seventy-three rate of retaliatory discharge 
for 2000 and a one-in-fifty-two rate for 2001-2007.61 
The Board’s data since 2007 on the incidence of section 8(a)(1) and 
(3) charges during organizing campaigns reveal that 1,454 representation 
cases contained such  charges in fiscal year 2007, 830 representation cases 
contained such charges in fiscal year 2008, and, so far in fiscal year 2009 
(as of October 1, 2009), 584 representation cases contain such charges.62  
Unfortunately, the Board’s figures do not reveal the number of employees 
discriminated against or the disposition of those charges. 
Whatever the rate of retaliatory discharge, it is too high.  The Board 
needs to make clear that it is prepared to seek court-imposed provisional 
reinstatement of every employee where there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the employer discharged the employee for seeking collective represen-
tation.  No other remedy under current law would more effectively bring 
home the central message of the NLRA: Employees will not suffer any loss 
of employment or benefit if they choose to engage in concerted activity.  
Section 10(l) expressly grants the Board this authority and requires the   
regional director to seek preliminary injunctions to restrain certain union 
ULPs.63  Section 10(j), the provision governing other ULPs (including all 
employer ULPs), is stated in more discretionary terms and contemplates 
action by the Board: “The Board shall have power . . . to petition [the feder-
al district court] for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. . . .64 
Although section 10(j) speaks in terms of action by the Board, the 
agency has from time to time, with judicial approval,65 delegated this au-
thority to either the General Counsel or the regional directors.  Presently, 
because the Board has only two members, the Board has delegated its sec-
tion 10(j) authority to the General Counsel.66  Even after the Board reaches 
full strength, it should keep in place this delegation.  This will eliminate the 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Paul C. Weller, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (1983). 
 60 See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Metzler, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the 
Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 992 (1991). 
 61 See John Schmitt & Ben Zipperer, Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election 
Campaigns, 1951-2007, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, at 5, 10-11 (March 2009), 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dropping-the-ax-update-2009-03.pdf. 
 62 NLRB data (on file with author). 
 63 NLRA § 10(l), 29 U.S.C.  § 160(l) (2006). 
 64 NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C.  § 160(j) (2006). 
 65 See, e.g., Muffley v.  Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 540 (4th Cir.  2009). 
 66 See id. at 539. 
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delay inherent in requiring the regional director to obtain authority to seek a 
preliminary injunction from both the General Counsel and the Board.  
Moreover, the Board should direct the General Counsel to seek section 
10(j) relief in every case where there is reasonable cause to believe an   
employer fired an employee during an organizing drive or an election cam-
paign for exercising statutory rights.  To bolster the agency’s credibility in 
the district courts, and in fairness to legitimate employer interests, the   
General Counsel should provide employers an opportunity to challenge the 
credibility of witnesses in a one- or two-day hearing before authorizing the 
section 10(j) application.67  The Board and General Counsel also should 
systematically review procedures for processing section 10(j) requests in 
order to minimize avoidable delay.68 
2. Imposing Bargaining Obligations Due to the Absence of Good-
Faith Doubt in the Union’s Majority 
The Board has the authority to dispense with its “election preference” 
policy and impose a bargaining obligation on employers who lack a reason-
able good-faith basis for doubting the union’s card-based majority status.69  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,70 the 
Board asserted the authority to impose such obligations on employers that 
commit ULPs indicating a lack of good-faith doubt.71  In Gissel,72 the Court 
noted that the Board said that it no longer followed the “good faith doubt” 
policy the Board had previously established in Aaron Brothers Co.73 and 
Joy Silk Mills, Inc.74  The Court’s Gissel decision and its subsequent ruling 
in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co v. NLRB75 make clear, however, 
that the Board’s “election preference” policy is an exercise of the Board’s 
policymaking discretion and is not affirmatively required by the Act.76 
                                                                                                                           
 67 I thank former NLRB Regional Director Daniel Silverman for the latter suggestion. 
 68 Time periods for 2004-2008 are set forth in Table 3, supra.  Detail on the cases referenced in 
Table 3 are provided in Appendix A to this article.  
 69 NLRB v.  Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 591-92. 
 72 Id. at 590-94. 
 73 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). 
 74 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949). 
 75 419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974). 
 76 The Aaron Brothers-Joy Silk approach is administratively more manageable and more con-
sistent with underlying deterrence goals than the present “can a fair rerun-election be held?” test.  This is 
because, while the ultimate question is one of the employer’s good faith doubt of the union’s majority 
status, the inquiry is principally an objective one – whether the employer has committed unfair labor 
practices inconsistent with claimed good faith.  Moreover, reviewing courts need to be reminded of the 
origins and limits of the Board’s “election preference” policy in reviewing NLRB bargaining orders.  
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3. Remedies for Unlawful Refusal to Bargain 
Under section 8(d), the Board does not have the authority to impose a 
contract or any contract term as a remedy for an employer’s refusal to bar-
gain in good faith.77  The Board in appropriate circumstances may impose 
so-called extraordinary union access78 as well as negotiation and litigation 
expense remedies,79 but the Board’s remedial apparatus also includes the 
ability to treat any strike in protest of the employer’s ULPs as an ULP 
strike, thereby privileging the strikers to reinstatement in their previous jobs 
once they have made clear they wish to return.80  Under current Board prac-
tice, the determination that a strike is an ULP strike occurs only retrospec-
tively, after the strike has occurred and after employers have replaced strik-
ing employees.81  The Board should consider a more liberal advisory opin-
ion practice, at least in first-time bargaining situations, that provides critical 
information to employees before they put their jobs at risk.  Employees 
should be able to petition the Board for a nonbinding preliminary ruling as 
to whether the Board is likely to treat the strike as an ULP strike.82 
A combination of the three remedial proposals offers a promising start.  
In addition to the “extraordinary” remedies now in use, the Board would be 
                                                                                                                           
Interim relief under section 1.0(j) is also important here.  See generally Samuel Estreicher, The Second 
Circuit and the NLRB 1980-1981: A Case Study in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 48 BROOK L.  
REV. 1063, 1084-94 (1982); Laura S. Cooper & Dennis R. Nolan, The Story of NLRB v. Gissel Packing: 
The Practical Limits of Paternalism in LABOR LAW STORIES 213, 215-17, 219-22 (Laura J. Cooper & 
Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005). 
 77 See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).  The discussion assumes arguendo that 
H.K. Porter’s treatment of 8(d) bars the “make-whole” remedy considered but rejected in Ex-Cell-O 
Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970).  That assumption also warrants reexamination by the NLRB. 
 78 See Monfort, Inc. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 1538, 1547-48 (10th Cir. 1992); Fieldcrest Cannon, 318 
N.L.R.B. 470, 473 (1995), enforced in part, 97 F.3d 65, 74 (4th Cir. 1996).   General Counsel Ronald 
Meisburg has commendably given priority treatment to the need for special remedies in first-contract 
bargaining cases.  See OFFICE OF THE GEN.  COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 06.05 (2006); OFFICE OF THE 
GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 07-08 (2007); OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 08-
08 (2008); OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. G.C. 08-09 (2008), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/research/general_counsel_memos.aspx (select year of memorandum and follow 
hyperlink to document). 
 79 See Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859-60 (1995), enforced in relevant part, 118 
F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Alwin Mfg. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (1998), enforced, 192 F.2d 133 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999).  The Board could make these remedies more readily available after proper rulemaking pro-
cedures.  See supra Part I.B. 
 80 For an interesting proposal to protect ULP strikes, see William R.  Corbett, A Proposal for 
Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Replacements: “A Far, Far Better Thing” Than the Work-
place Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L. REV. 813 (1994). 
 81 Id. 
 82 The entire issue of when an economic strike becomes converted into an ULP strike calls for 
greater reliance by the Board on declaratory orders.  See id.  The Board's current procedures provide for 
advisory opinions and declaratory orders regarding jurisdiction.  See NLRB, Rules and Regulations and 
Statements of Procedure – § 101.39-101.43 (2009). 
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able to (1) reinstate employees preliminarily when there is reasonable cause 
to believe an employer discharged the person in violation of section 8(a)(3); 
(2) impose a bargaining obligation on the employer because of the absence 
of good-faith doubt, as evidenced by employer ULPs, in appropriate cases 
backed up by a petition for interim injunctive relief; and (3) employ an ad-
visory ruling procedure to inform employees whether the Board is likely to 
treat the strike they are engaged in as an ULP strike.  Together, the options 
would go far in allowing the Board to structure a meaningful remedy even 
in first-time bargaining situations. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
These proposals are by no means exhaustive; more can be said and 
other ideas pursued.  In any event, the NLRA has not “ossified,” as some in 
academic circles have claimed.  Rather, its principal guardians, the mem-
bers of the NLRB and General Counsel, need to take seriously their man-
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02/04/2003   Y    01/12/2004 
02/04/2003   Y  12/05/2003  01/12/2004 
02/04/2003   Y  12/05/2003 12/30/2003 01/12/2004 
02/04/2003 02/03/2003 N Y 10/27/2003 12/05/2003 12/31/2003 01/12/2004 
06/09/2005 06/09/2005 Y  07/26/2005 10/19/2005 11/25/2005 12/01/2005 
07/14/2003 02/09/2004 Y Y 02/09/2004 04/16/2004 05/06/2004 05/11/2004 
08/17/2004 08/18/2004 N Y 09/08/2004  12/16/2004 12/22/2004 
10/12/2005 01/04/2006 Y Y 01/11/2006 05/17/2006 05/25/2006 06/06/2006 
09/17/2004 09/17/2004 Y Y 12/05/2004  07/13/2005 07/19/2005 
04/07/2005 04/07/2005 N Y 06/01/2005  10/19/2005 10/25/2005 
05/12/2005 05/12/2005 N  08/16/2005   10/26/2005 
07/09/2004 12/29/2004 N Y 02/28/2005 06/08/2005 07/06/2005 07/11/2005 
07/25/2005 07/25/2005 Y  10/27/2005 01/03/2006 02/15/2006 02/24/2006 
10/06/2006 10/06/2006 Y  12/19/2006 01/26/2007 02/14/2007 04/23/2007 
01/25/2005 01/25/2005 Y Y 08/03/2005   10/24/2005 
08/31/2005 11/30/2005 Y Y 12/15/2005 04/05/2006 05/04/2006 05/08/2006 
02/06/2006 03/01/2006 N Y 10/16 10/16/2006 12/06/2006 12/11/2006 
05/03/2006   Y    12/11/2006 
06/08/2006 12/06/2006 N Y 04/19/2007 05/29/2007 07/11/2007 07/13/2007 
07/22/2008   Y   11/17/2008 11/20/2008 
07/22/2008   Y 03/16/2009  11/17/2008 11/20/2008 
07/22/2008 07/22/2008 N Y 09/2412008  10/17/2008 11/20/2008 
07/22/2008 11/21/2008 N Y 03/16/2009  10/17/2008 11/20/2008 
06/25/2004 08/13/2004 Y  11/05/2004 02/23/2005 03/21/2005 03/ 24/2005 
03/24/2006 03/30/2006 Y  06/16/2006 07/18/2006 08/10/2006 08/15/2006 
06/02/2005 06/28/2005 Y  07/28/2006 01/29/2008 01/29/2008 01/31/2008 

























07/06/2005 07/26/2005 Y  03/06/2006 04/26/2006 06/06/2006 06/09/2006 
01/29/2007 10/24/2007 Y Y 11/20/2007  12/28/2007 01/08/2008 
05/16/2006 05/16/2006 Y Y 09/06/2006  12/15/2006 01/10/2007 
10/05/2007 10/05/2007 Y Y 12/17/2007   04/22/2008 
07/07/2006 07/07/2006 N  08/10/2006 09/18/2006 10/05/2006 10/10/2006 
0711/2007 08/01/2007 Y Y 08/10/2007 09/19/2007 10/09/2007 10/12/2007 
01/08/2008 02/22/2008 Y Y 02/22/2008 04/0912008 04/17/2008 0411812008 
01/08/2008 05/02/2008 Y Y 05/02/2008   08/05/2008 
02/15/2008 02/15/2008 N  03/11/2008 05/08/2008 05/08/2008 05/13/2008 
04/10/2007 04/10/2007 Y  06/25/2007 07/30/2007 08/16/2007 08/17/2007 
07/08/2005 07/08/2005 Y  11/04/2005 02/16/2006 03/24/2006 03/23/2006 
08/14/2006 10/31/2006 Y Y 11/17/2006 01/11/2007 02/01/2007 02/0812007 
12/08/2006 01/12/2007 Y Y 02/16/2007 05/02/2007 05/16/2007 05/21/2007 
12/22/2006 12/22/2006 N  03/12/2007 05/07/2007 05/25/2007 05/30/2007 
08/30/2004 08/30/2004 Y  12/20/2004 01/04/2005 02/16/2005 03/01/2005 
02/02/2005 02/24/2005 N  Y 04/04/2005 03/08/2006 05/10/2006 05/16/2006 
11/16/2005 11/16/2005 N Y 04/27/2006 05/30/2006 06/28/2006 06/29/2006 
04/09/2003 07/29/2003 N Y 05/13/2004 06/24/2004 07/29/2004 08/02/2004 
10/18/2005 10/18/2005 Y  02/24/2006 10/31/2006 11/24/2006 11/28/2006 
07/14/2004 08/10/2004 Y Y 04/01/2005 08/18/2005 11/02/2005 11/17/2005 
01/03/2005 01/19/2005 Y  05/19/2005 08/01/2005 11/07/2005 11/23/2005 
09/21/2005 09/21/2005 N  01/18/2006 08/04/2006 08/27/2006 08/31/2006 
11/21/2001 04/03/2006 Y  04/12/2006 05/09/2006 05/31/2006 06/06/2006 
07/19/2002 12/17/2002 N Y 11/18/2003 11/18/2003 02/10/2004 02/13/2004 
01/20/2004 08/16/2004 Y Y 08/19/2004 09/13/2004 10/22/2004 10/27/2004 
06/13/2006 08/10/2006 Y  08/10/2006  03/14/2007 03/19/2007 
09/18/2007 09/27/2007 Y Y 01/16/2008 0212812008 02/28/2008 03/06/2008 
10/31/2006 12/21/2006 Y  03/01/2007 06/01/2007 06/21/2007 06/27/2007 
07/17/2002 04/17/2003 N Y 11 /07/2003 01/22/2004 01/22/2004 01/26/2004 

























08/09/2006 09/22/2006 Y Y 01/10/2007   05/11/2007 
09/07/2006 11/21/2006 Y     03/19/2007 
09/18/2006 11/21/2006 Y Y    03/19/2007 
09/22/2006 11/21/2006 Y  01/05/2007 01/31/2007 03/14/2007 03/19/2007 
03/05/2007 03/26/2007 Y  04/25/2007 06/29/2007  07/27/2007 
04/29/2002 05/01/2002 Y Y 07/15/2002 09/12/2002  02/20/2004 
07/14/2004 07/14/2004 Y Y 11/19/2004 01/04/2005 02/15/2005 02/25/2005 
09/27/2004 09/27/2004 Y Y 02/24/2005 12/13/2005 03/29/2006 04/10/2006 
07/22/2005 07/22/2005 Y Y 07/28/2006 07/20/2007 07/24/2007 07/30/2007 
10/11/2005 08/30/2006 Y Y 03/29/2007   06/14/2007 
03/24/2006 03/24/2006 Y Y 03/29/2007 05/15/2007 06/05/2007 06/14/2007 
09/29/2006 10/03/2006 Y Y 07/13/2007  09/17/2007 09/25/2007 
08/13/2007 08/15/2007 Y  12/28/2007 03/19/2008 03/19/2008 03/21/2008 
09/03/2003 10/15/2005 Y Y 10/18/2005 12/05/2005 01/24/2006 01/30/2006 
01/12/2006 01/12 2006 Y Y 05/23/2006 06/30/2006 07/20/2006 07/25/2006 
08/18/2006 01/14/2008 N Y 02/04/2008  02/29/2008 03/06/2008 
01/26/2007 01/26/2007 N Y 07/17/2007 02/07/2008 02/14/2008 02/20/2008 
02/01/2007 02/08/2007 Y Y 07/17/2007 02/07/2008 02/14/2008 02/20/2008 
10/04/2005 10/18/2005 Y  11/23/2005  02/24/2006 03/01/2006 
05/16/2008 06/09/2008 Y Y 07/25/2008 09/23/2008  11/25/2008 
12/19/2003 12/22/2003 Y Y 02/11/2005 07/12/2006 07/26/2006 07/28/2006 
01/29/2008 01/29/2008 Y  06/01/2008 07/10/2008 07/10/2008 07/14/2008 
Source: NLRB data (on file with author). 
